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ABSTRACT  
 
We compare the current Canadian Supply Management regime in which producers and 
importers benefit from rent-seeking activities that set production quota and import quota levels 
with those under a tariff, in which producers partakes in rent-seeking activities in order to induce 
the government to introduce a favorable tariff regime.  We explore three different quota-setting 
games: (1) the import quota and production quota are set at a level that arises from a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium between producers and importers; (2) the producer marketing board acts as a 
Stackelberg leader, taking into account the importers’ reaction to its production quota level; and 
(3) the importer behaves as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account producers’ reaction to its 
import quota level.  We compare these quota-setting games with two different tariff-setting 
games: (1) A non-cooperative game in which the government sets the tariff at a level that 
maximizes tariff revenue; and (2) A cooperative game in which producers, through rent-seeking 
activities, induce the government to set the tariff at a level that maximizes joint government and 
producer rents. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are many real-world cases where producers are protected by import quotas.  In 
addition, these producers are legally able to control production through supply management-type 
arrangements (i.e. quotas).  They are essentially allowed to behave as profit maximizing 
monopolists subject to a voluntary export constraint placed upon importing firms [Harris, 1985].  
There are also cases in which joint production and import controls exist.  These controls come 
from both importers and producers and are enforced by their respective governments 
[Vercammen and Schmitz, 1992].  Under these types of arrangements, producers earn rents 
above those attainable under competitive conditions.  Correspondingly, private importers earn 
import rents which would not be available under a world free-trade environment [Barichello, 
1981, Vercammen & Schmitz, 1992, and Schmitz, Furtan, and Baylis, 2002].  The Canadian 
system of supply management for agricultural goods such as dairy and poultry represents one 
such case. 
There have been several proposals to eliminate both import and production quotas for 
supply-managed products in Canada.  For Example, on August 13, 1991, the Canadian 
International Trade Tribunal undertook an inquiry into the allocation of import quotas.  One 
option was to replace import quotas under the Canadian supply management system with tariffs, 
thereby diverting revenue from private importers to the government via tariffs.  This so-called 
tariffication proposal has been described elsewhere [Moschini and Meilke, 1991; Schmitz and 
Schmitz, 1994; Schmitz, de Gorter, and Schmitz, 1996; Schmitz, Furtan, and Baylis, 2002].  In 
1995, as a part of GATT negotiations that led to the formulation of the WTO, import quotas for 
Canadian supply management were replaced with a system of tariff-rate quotas.  However, the 
over-quota tariffs for supply managed goods were set at prohibitive levels, while the within-
quota trade volumes (minimum access levels) were set at essentially the same level as the import 
quotas that existed under the original supply management scheme.  In addition, the original 
system of production quotas under supply management still remains in place. 
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Several studies have examined the issue of replacing quotas with tariffs in which the 
domestic firm has market power.  The well-known results on the "nonequivalence" of quotas and 
tariffs [eg. Bhagwati, 1965] state that tariffs and quotas are not equivalent1 in a world which is 
not perfectly competitive.  Other studies have looked at the issue of tariffication in the presence 
of  monopoly assuming different types of "non-economic objectives".  For example, [Sweeney 
et. al., 1977] attempt to rank alternative tariff and quota policies by assuming that the 
government's objective is to attain a target ratio of imports to domestic production.  McCulloch 
[1973] examines the welfare cost associated with tariff or quota protection allowing the cost to 
depend on the objective underlying protection.  Another analysis [Vercammen and Schmitz, 
1992] concludes that if producers under supply-management are forced to choose between 
offering import concessions and abandoning supply-management, they will, in specific 
circumstances, choose the former.  While these papers have answered many questions 
concerning the elimination of supply-management, none of them have explored the effects of 
replacing a quota with a tariff under the assumption that producers and private importers non-
cooperatively determine domestic production and the level of imports.  Vercammen and Schmitz 
[1993] have modelled this endogeneity on the supply-managed side and analyzed the effects of a 
move to free trade, but the effects of government intervention have not yet been explored. 
The purpose of this paper is to compare a supply-managed quota systemin which 
producers and importers benefit from rent-seeking activities that set production quota and import 
quota levelswith those under a tariffwhere producers partakes in rent-seeking activities in 
order to induce the government to introduce a favorable tariff regime.  Under the existing supply 
management regime, the level of production quotas and import quotas are jointly determined 
through the interaction of a marketing board that represents all domestic Canadian producers, 
and private importers whose import level and allocation of import quotas among producers is set 
by a single entity.  We explore three different cases; (1) the import quota and production quota 
                                                 
1  Bhagwati defines tariffs and quotas as equivalent if the replacement of an explicit tariff by a quota set at 
the import level under the tariff will produce an implicit tariff which is identical to the explicit tariff. 
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are set at a level that arises from a Cournot-Nash equilibrium between producers and importers; 
(2) the producer marketing board acts as a Stackelberg leader, taking into account the importers’ 
reaction to its production quota level; and (3) the importer behaves as a Stackelberg leader, 
taking into account producers’ reaction to its import quota level.  
The above situation is compared to a scenario in which the government eliminates import 
quotas and imposes a tariff in an attempt to collect tariff revenues.  The possible outcomes under 
the imposition of such a tariff are many.  The tariff revenue and producer rents that result from 
tariffication depend on the degree to which the government and the producers cooperate.  We 
present two situations that may arise under tariffication.  The first situation assumes that the 
government sets the tariff at a level that maximizes tariff revenue.  The second situation assumes 
that the government and producers cooperate in an attempt to maximize their joint revenue.  We 
discuss the results by making comparisons across these alternative scenarios. 
 
II.  PRODUCERS AND IMPORTERS RENT-SEEK (INITIAL SUPPLY MANAGEMENT SCHEME) 
For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that producer and private import groups can 
successfully (and costlessly) lobby the government to set both the production quota and import 
quota at whatever level they jointly decide upon.  In essence, the producer and importer 
determine the quota levels endogenously.  We employ the small country assumption so that 
importers purchase the commodity from exporters at a constant world price (incurring no 
transaction costs) and sell it to domestic consumers at a markup.  The remainder of domestic 
demand is satisfied by domestic producers.  Private importers collect revenue in the form of 
import rents while producers receive economic rents that exceed those under competition, due to 
the power of producer groups to lobby the government to set a statutory production quota, 
administered through the supply management marketing board. 
Figure 1 shows a typical situation in which producers and importers partake in rent-seeking 
activities.  The consumers' demand curve is represented by D, the monopolist's marginal cost 
curve is given by MC, and Pw is the price at which the importer can purchase the good from the 
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rest of the world.  Assuming (for the moment) that the quota level is fixed at I and that domestic 
supply is fixed at Qs, the total quantity supplied to the domestic market would be Qd = Qs + I.  
In equilibrium, the consumer price would be set at Pd which is where the total quantity 
demanded equals the total quantity supplied.  Under this situation, importer rents are given by 
the markup (Pd - Pw) times the importer level and are represented by the cross-hatched region in 
Figure 1.  Producer rents are determined by the area above the marginal cost curve and below the 
domestic price, bound by the domestic quantity supplied Qs.  These rents are represented by the 
shaded area in Figure 1. 
Notice that Figure 1 is drawn assuming away the endogeneity of the quota level.  This is 
just one arbitrary scenario in which the level of domestic production happens to be set below the 
level that which would exist under free trade.  However, if the quota is allowed to be determined 
endogenously then many different scenarios can exist.  For example, consider the proposal to do 
away with supply management schemes altogether.  Proponents of this would argue that because 
supply managed industries provide unfair protection to domestic producers, eliminating quotas 
would cause more imports to enter the country.  However, as [Vercammen and Schmitz, 1993] 
point out, once the import quota is endogenized, situations can arise in which the import quotas 
that exist under supply-management can actually be larger than the level of imports that would 
exist under free trade. 
 
II.1  MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Let the country's inverse domestic demand schedule and producers’ marginal cost schedule 
be given by  and )( IQbaPd +−= QMC βα +=   where Q, I, Pd, and MC denote domestic 
production, imports, the price paid by consumers, and the marginal cost, respectfully, and a,b,α, 
and β are positive constants.  These parameters can be expressed in terms of the world price Pw, 
what would be the level of imports under world competition (free trade) Iw, and the domestic 
quantity of production under free trade Qw using the elasticity of supply ε (measured at Pw and 
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Qw) as well as the absolute value of the elasticity of demand η (measured at Pw and Qw + Iw) 
as:   
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Also, define two more parameters which will later be used for simplification purposes.  Let 
r = ε η/  be the ratio of the elasticity of supply over the absolute value of the elasticity of demand 
under world free trade competition.  Define .  For example, ww QI +=0γ  
and w QrI )1( ++1 =γ .  This implies that  since r is positive.  Also, let 
w
w
P
P−dPM =   be the percentage mark up over the world price where Pd is the consumer price of 
the commodity in question.  Finally, let  be the producer's market share that would 
be realized under world free trade so that (1-θ ) would be the importers’ market share under free 
trade. 
Using the above notation the producer rentsrepresented by the shaded region in Figure 1 
can be expressed mathematically as  and the import rents (the cross-
hatched area in Figure 1) are simply .  We can use the other 
parameters as well to express these rents in terms of elasticities.  For example, under world free 
trade (where import rents are zero since Pd = Pw) producer rents can be expressed as 
ε2/www QPPR = .  These formulae, along with general maximization principles are used 
extensively in the following sections to endogenously determine the quota and import levels as 
well as rents under different types of interactions between producers and importers. 
 
II.2  COURNOT-NASH DETERMINATION OF PRODUCTION AND IMPORT QUOTAS 
 In the standard Cournot-Nash (CN) quantity setting game, we find the reaction function 
for the monopolist given imports Q(I) and the reaction function for the private importer given 
domestic quantity I(Q).  This process yields two equations in two unknowns which are solved 
simultaneously to determine the Nash equilibrium import quota and domestic production levels:2 
                                                 
2 The outcome will be unique because the marginal cost and inverse demand curves are both continuous and 
monotonically increasing (decreasing) functions. 
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Modelling the quota structure in a CN fashion has more intuitive appeal when one player is 
not allowed to dominate another.  Thus, this model makes more sense when the producer's 
market share is near fifty percent (i.e. when 5.0≅θ ).3  In the following two sections we will 
discuss the difference between this CN solution and the one in which either player is allowed to 
dominate the other. 
 
 II.3  THE PRODUCER GROUP IS THE STACKELBERG LEADER             
In this section we assume that producers become the Stackelberg leader (ML) and 
importers follow.  This model would tend to apply to cases in which producer market share is 
significantly larger than that of the importer (i.e. θ is closer to 1 than 0).4  Under this scenario, 
                                                 
3One could argue that the relative efficiency (in terms of marginal costs) would be a more plausible indicator 
of whether the two firms compete in a Cournot-Nash fashion or in a Stackelberg manner.  It may be the case that a 
firm that is relatively more efficient would tend to dominate the less efficient firm.  However, in this model 
producers have linear marginal costs while importers can be viewed as having constant marginal costs.  These cost 
functions are not directly comparable because they are linear and cross only once.  Thus, relative efficiency depends 
on the range of quantities under consideration. 
4 This case in which domestic producers have a relatively large market share would apply, for example, in 
the Canadian supply-managed broiler industry in which the domestic market comprises over 90 percent of total 
domestic consumption. 
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the producers maximize their economic rent given the reaction of the importer.  That is, the 
producers knows I(Q) from above and maximizes accordingly: 
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Using the endogenously determined quota level Iml the percentage markup over world 
price becomes: 
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Producer and importer rents become: 
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II.4  THE IMPORTER GROUP IS THE STACKELBERG LEADER 
In this section we explore the case in which importers are the Stackelberg leader (IL) and 
the producers follow.  This model would tend to apply when private importers have a larger 
market share than producers (i.e. θ is closer to 0 than 1).  Under this scenario, the importer 
maximizes import rents with respect to the level of imports, given the reaction function Q(I) 
from Section 1: 
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Under this case, the percentage markup over the world pricee received by importers 
becomes: 
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Producer and importer rents become: 
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II.5  COMPARING RENTS UNDER PRODUCER AND IMPORTER ARRANGEMENTS 
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In this section we compare the three different supply management outcomes, in which 
producers rent-seek in order to set production quotas and importers rent-seek in order to set 
import quotas.  The three different outcomes under consideration are the Cournot-Nash (CN), 
Producer Stackelberg Leader (ML) and the Importer Stackelberg Leader (IL).  Comparisons 
among all the different possible combinations will now be made in turn.  A summary of these 
comparisons and comparisons made between these quantity-setting games and the tariff setting 
games of the next section are contained in Tables 1-5. 
First, consider the Cournot-Nash vs. the Producer Stackelberg Leader outcomes.  The 
production quota under ML and CN can be compared by analyzing the ratio of the quantity 
under ML with respect to the quantity under CN.  Simplifying this ratio yields the following 
relationship: 

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Since r (the absolute value of the ratio of the elasticity of supply over the elasticity of 
demand) is positive and Qw and γ are positive, it must be the case that the production quota will 
be larger when producers lead when compared to the Cournot-Nash outcome.  A similar ratio 
can be used to determine the difference between import quotas set under these two arrangements.  
Division and extensive simplification yields:5 
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Hence, import quotas under CN are always higher than under ML.  Domestic prices under 
each of these outcomes can be compared through a similar procedure, using the percentage 
markups over the world price.  After simplification, the ratio of the two domestic prices 
becomes: 
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5K refers to a constant.  This constant is different in each of the equations that it is presented throughout the 
text. 
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Hence, the domestic price under CN is higher than under ML.  This also implies that the 
total quantity consumed under CN is always lower than under ML, so that consumers prefer ML. 
What about producer and importer rents?  As one would expect, the ratio of production 
quota rents under the two outcomes becomes: 
www
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This expression is less than 1, which implies that producer rents are always higher under 
ML.  Finally, the ratio of import rents reduces simply to: 
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As to be expected, since imports are always higher under CN, import quota rents are 
always higher under Cournot-Nash than the situation in which producers lead.  To summarize: 
producers are always better off, importers are worse off, and the consumer is better off under ML 
compared to CN.  These results are summarized in Tables 1-5. 
 Next, consider the Cournot-Nash (CN) vs. the Importer Stackelberg Leader (IL) game.  
As expected, a similar analysis reveals just the opposite for this situation.  Specifically, the 
production quota is always higher and the import quota is always lower under CN when 
compared to IL.  Also, domestic prices are higher under CN which implies that total 
consumption is lower under CN and consumers prefer IL.  Finally, producer rents are higher and 
import rents are lower under CN than under IL.  These results are also summarized in Tables 1-5. 
One can also make comparisons across the two Stackelberg games.  Besides the 
comparisons that hold by transitivity through the CN case (i.e. that producer rents are larger and 
import rents are lower under ML than IL), we can compare the domestic prices under ML and 
IL. The ratio of the domestic price under ML with respect to IL simplifies to: 
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This relationship can be further simplified by multiplying the top and bottom of the price 
ratio by (Qw+Iw) and making use of the market share parameter θ that would exist under free 
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trade.  It turns out that if the producer has a larger free trade market share than the importer, the 
total quantity supplied to the domestic market will be larger under ML than under IL.  The 
inverse is true if the importer has a larger market share, while the total supply is the same when θ 
= 0.5.  Thus, if θ > 0.5 the price is higher under IL than under ML implying that consumer 
welfare is greater under ML.  If θ > 0.5 then consumers are worse off under IL.  Again, these 
results are summarized in Tables 1-5. 
 
III  GOVERNMENT RENT-SEEKING (A SYSTEM OF TARIFFS) 
In Section II we considered the case of importers and producers rent-seeking in order to 
non-cooperatively determine the domestic production quota and the import quota that results 
under the supply management regime.  We derived the resulting price markups and producer and 
importer rents under various scenarios.  In this section, we consider the case in which the 
government eliminates the import quota scheme under supply management and replaces it with a 
tariff.  Under this scenario, importers do not receive rents from the import quota, because it no 
longer exists.  Instead, the government captures import rents in the form of tariff revenue. 
Once the government enters the picture, the interaction among players (producers and the 
government) can no longer be modeled as a quantity-quantity setting game.  Under this scenario 
the government sets the tariff, which then determines the equilibrium level of domestic 
production and the equilibrium domestic price.  We present the results for two plausible ways in 
which the government might set the tariff: (1) The government chooses a tariff level that 
maximizes revenue; or (2) The government chooses a tariff level that maximizes joint revenue 
between the government and producers. 
 
III.1  GOVERNMENT SETS THE TARIFF THAT MAXIMIZES ITS REVENUE 
The effect of eliminating supply management and replacing it with a tariff that is set in 
order to maximize government revenue is depicted in Figure 2 where MC is the marginal cost 
schedule for producers and D is total demand.  Pw represents the world price and Qw is the 
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domestic quantity that would be produced under free trade.  PC represents the equilibrium price 
and quantity that would exist under autarky in perfect domestic competition.  Consider a tariff 
level t that results in a price Pw+t that is lower than PC in Figure 2.  Within the range from Pw to 
Pc a reduction in the tariff causes a reduction in domestic production, yielding positive imports 
and thus positive tariff revenue for the government.  Hence, if the government objective is to 
maximize tariff revenue, the government will set the tariff at some value t so that the world price 
plus the tariff is not higher than PC in Figure 2.  This leads to tariff revenue of the cross-hatched 
area and producer rents equal to the shaded region. 
Retaining the notation from Section II we can express this problem (GN) as 
{ QTPGRMax wT }βα +=+| .  Where GR is government tariff revenue and α β+ Q is producers’ 
marginal cost.  The solution to this optimization problem results in an ad-valorem tariff level of: 
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These relationships imply that the domestic production quota Qgn will always be higher 
than or equal to the free-trade domestic quantity Qw but less than Qc in Figure 2.  In addition, 
the total quantity purchased by consumers (Qgn + Ign) will always be lower under this non-
cooperative government rent-seeking game, when compared to free trade. 
Producer rents and Government tariff revenue under this scenario are: 
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  The government will import some quantity for which it will collect tariff revenue of the 
amount GRgn and producers will receive rents of PRgn.  The amount of this tariff revenue will 
decrease in the demand elasticity parameter η. 
  
III.2  GOVERNMENT SETS THE TARIFF IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE JOINT  
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 PRODUCER AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
In this section we present an alternative in which the government sets the tariff at a level 
that maximizes joint producer and government rents.  There are actually two separate 
mathematical representations for this problem, both of which must be explored.  The choice of 
alternatives depends upon whether the tariff is set at or below the prohibitive level that would 
exist under autarky, or whether the tariff is set at a prohibitive level that is higher than what 
would exist under autarky.  Each of these cases will be discussed in turn. 
  The first possibility, is that the tariff level gets set at or below the prohibitive level .  In 
this case, the joint maximization problem can be expressed as: 
 { } CwT PTPIRPRJRMax ≤++=  
The solution to the maximization problem results in an equilibrium ad-valorem tariff level: 
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and an equilibrium level of imports of Igc = 0. 
Finally, producer rents and tariff revenues are given by: 
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From the above analysis, a tariff level equal to T0 is prohibitive, and results in no imports 
with a price and quantity solution that is exactly equal to the price (PC in figure 2) and quantity 
that would exist under autarky with pure competition.  Hence, regardless of the elasticities of 
supply or demand, T0 acts as a floor for the tariff that the government will set if it is attempting 
to jointly maximize producer rents and tariff revenue.  This implies that any cooperative joint 
maximization involving a tariff will result in a prohibitive tariff with no imports and no 
government revenue.  In essence, the tariff that maximizes joint revenue is the same as the tariff 
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that solely maximizes producer rents.  This leads to the outcome described below, which will 
eventually turn out to be equivalent to the monopoly solution under autarky. 
In this case, the joint maximization problem (GC) can be expressed as: 
 { } CwT PTPPRJRMax ≥+=  
The solution to the maximization problem results in an equilibrium ad-valorem tariff level: 
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Substituting and simplifying yields the following values for production and imports: 
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Producer rents and tariff revenue under this case are equal to: 
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This tariff is always higher than the minimum prohibitive tariff, because: 
K
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is always greater than one.  Hence, if producers can rent-seek in order to get the 
government to maximize joint revenue, it would result in a tariff above the minimum prohibitive 
tariff (the tariff that would induce autarky), which would be the same as the tariff level that 
maximizes producer rents and results in the monopoly level of production.  This situation results 
in a price PM and quantity QM in Figure 2 which occurs where marginal revenue (not shown) 
intersects marginal cost. 
Next, we compare the cooperative joint maximizing tariff game (GC) with the non-
cooperative tariff game (GN).  First, comparing quantities under GC with GN yields: 
223
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Hence, the quantity under the tariff game that maximizes producer rents (GC) will be 
higher than the quantity under the tariff game that maximizes tariff revenue (GN) only if: 
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Imports and tariff revenue are always lower under GC because imports are always zero 
under the tariff game that maximizes producer rents, but are always positive under the tariff 
revenue maximization game (GN).  The domestic consumer price is always higher under GC 
because the tariff is always set above the prohibitive level, while the tariff under GN is always 
set below the prohibitive level.  Finally, producer rents are always higher under GC when 
compared to GN because it has already been shown that this solution results in the price and 
quantity combination that maximizes producer rents.  
 
IV.  COMPARING QUOTAS WITH TARIFFS 
In this section we compare and contrast the results of the quota-setting games of section II 
with the tariff-setting games of section III.  
 
IV.1  Non-Cooperative Tariff (GN) vs. Quantity-Setting Games 
 Here, we compare the non-cooperative tariff setting game (GN) of section III with the 
various quantity setting games of section II.  First, comparing quantities under the non-
cooperative tariff with the Cournot-Nash outcome yields: 
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This implies that the quantity produced under the non-cooperative tariff is larger than under the 
Cournot-Nash.  Comparing the quantities under the producer-leader Stackelberg game to the 
non-cooperative tariff game yields: 
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This implies that the quantity produced under the non-cooperative tariff is larger than under the 
producer-leader Stackelberg game.  Through transitivity, the quantity produced under the non-
cooperative tariff must also be larger than under the importer-leader Stackelberg game. 
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 The ratio of imports under GN when compared to CN when simplified becomes: 
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Making use of the fact that Qw and Iw can be expressed in terms of the production and import 
shares that would exist under free trade (θ and (1-θ)), it turns out that imports under the 
government non-cooperative tariff setting game are greater (smaller) than imports under the 
Cournot-Nash quantity setting game if the import share that would exist under free trade is 
greater than (less than) 2/3. 
 The ratio of imports under GN when compared to ML when simplified is: 
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Further simplifying this relationship by substituting for θ reveals that if the import share 
that would exist under free trade were greater than ½, then imports under the government non-
cooperative tariff game are higher than imports under the producer-leader Stackelberg quantity 
setting game.  Finally, comparing the ratio of imports under GN when compared to IL when 
simplified yields: 
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Hence, if rQw2 is less than (greater than) one, imports under the government non-
cooperative tariff will be higher than (lower than) imports under the import-leader Stackelberg 
quantity setting game. 
In order to compare prices across the various cases, all we have to do is compare the ad-
valorem tariffs under the tariff-setting game with the markup rules under the quantity setting 
games.  First, comparing prices under GN with ML yields: 
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Since rQw is always positive, the consumer price under the government non-cooperative 
tariff is always smaller than the consumer price under the producer-leader Stackelberg game.  
This also means that the consumer price under the government non-cooperative tariff is always 
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smaller than the consumer price under the Cournot-Nash quantity setting game through 
transitivity. 
Comparing prices under GN with IL yields: 
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Hence if r(1+r)Qw2 is less (greater) than one, the consumer price under the government 
non-cooperative tariff would be greater (less) than the consumer price under the importer-leader 
Stackelberg game. 
In order to compare producer rents and import rents under the non-cooperative government 
tariff setting game with the various quantity setting games, simulations were performed over a 
wide range of values for θ and r.  These simulations were performed because the algebra 
involved with attempting to simplify the relative amount of rents across each case was too 
complex.6  It turns out that under a very wide range of values for θ and r, producer rents for the 
government tariff-revenue maximization game are always lower than those for any of the three 
quantity setting games.  In addition, import/tariff rents for the government tariff-revenue 
maximization game are also always lower than those for any of the three quantity setting games. 
 
IV.2  Joint Maximizing Tariff (GC) vs. Quantity-Setting Games 
 Here, we compare the cooperative joint maximizing tariff-setting game (GC) of section 
III with the various quantity-setting games of section II.  We can make several generalized 
comparisons between the GC outcome and all three different quantity-setting games.  First, 
imports and import rents are always higher under all import and production quota-setting 
quantity games because they are always zero under the joint maximizing tariff-setting game.  
Second, producer rents are always higher under GC because GC is the solution that maximizes 
                                                 
6 For example, the comparison between producer rents under the Cournot-Nash game and producer rents 
under the game in which the government sets the tariff in order to maximize revenue involves comparisons of 
polynomials that have combinations of fifth-order terms with respect to r and fourth-order terms with respect to θ.  
The simulation results are not provided in this paper due to space limitations.  However, these results are available 
from the author by request.   
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producer rents.  Third, domestic prices are always higher under GC than under any of the 
quantity-setting games, because the monopolist solution results in the largest reduction in the 
quantity produced, which results in the highest price.  Hence, consumers are always worse of 
under the joint maximizing tariff-setting game.  Again, these results are summarized in Tables 1-
5. 
All that remains is to compare production levels.  Comparing the quantities under the 
joint maximizing tariff with those under the Cournot-Nash quantity game yields: 
K
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So that the quantity produced under the joint maximizing tariff-setting game is always larger 
than the quantity under the Cournot-Nash import and production quota setting game.  Next, 
comparing quantities between GC and the producer-leading Stackelberg game yields: 
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Hence, the joint maximizing tariff-setting level of production will be higher than the production 
quota in the producer-leading Stackelberg game only if θ<1/2.  Finally, the joint maximizing 
level of production will always be higher than the production quota in the importer-leading 
Stackelberg game by transitivity, based on the fact that it is already higher than the Cournot-
Nash quantity, which in turn, is higher than the import-leading Stackelberg quantity. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
We have derived and compared possible outcomes when a government uses tariffs to 
replace endogenized quotas and thus engages in government rent-seeking activity in an attempt 
to collect tariff revenues.  We begin with one of three supply-management structures in which a 
importers and domestic producers engage in different quantity setting scenarios and are allowed 
to endogenously determine the initial import quota and domestic production levels.  Then we 
assume that the government enters the picture, eliminating quotas and interacting with the 
producers in a non-cooperative and a cooperative tariff setting arrangement.  We compare 
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consumer, producer, and importer welfare across these various scenarios.  Several results 
emerge.  If the government and the producers do not cooperate, the equilibrium tariff that the 
government sets will not be prohibitive and consumers will always be better off when compared 
to any of the supply-management structure.  On the other hand, if the government cooperates 
with producers in setting the tariff, the tariff will always be prohibitive.  Producers will always 
be better off and importers and consumers will always be worse off under the cooperative tariff 
when compared to any of the supply-management structures. 
Hence, if supply-management is replaced with a tariff regime, there are major incentives 
for rent-seeking behavior on the part of producers in order to get the tariff level set at that which 
maximizes joint government and producer rents.  Producers would be willing pay a considerable 
amount in rent-seeking activities in order to ensure the tariff is set at a prohibitive level.  In 
essence, under the WTO, this is what has happened.  With a minimal amount of concessions in 
terms of allowing a small percentage of imports under TRQs, producers were able to lobby the 
government to set the over-quota tariff at a prohibitive level for all supply-managed products. 
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Table 1:  Comparison of Domestic Production Levels under Various Trade Games 
 
 
 Production and Import Quota-Setting 
Games 
Tariff-Setting  
Games 
 Cournot 
Nash 
Producers 
Lead 
Importers 
Lead 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Max 
Joint 
Revenue  
Max 
Cournot-Nash 
 
equal 
n/a 
smaller 
n/a 
larger 
n/a 
smaller 
n/a 
smaller 
n/a 
Producers 
Lead 
 equal 
n/a 
larger 
n/a 
smaller 
n/a 
larger if 
θ>1/2 
Importers 
Lead 
  equal 
n/a 
smaller 
n/a 
smaller 
n/a 
Tariff Revenue 
Max 
   equal 
n/a 
larger if 
2rθ2>1-3θ 
Joint Revenue 
Max 
    equal 
n/a 
 
 
Comparisons are made by taking the games down the left-hand side and then comparing them to 
the games along the top row. 
• θ is the production share of total consumption that would exist under free trade. • r is the absolute value of the ratio of the supply elasticity to the demand elasticity. 
 21 
Table 2:  Comparison of Import Levels under Various Trade Games 
 
 
 Production and Import Quota-Setting 
Games 
Tariff-Setting  
Games 
 Cournot 
Nash 
Producers 
Lead 
Importers 
Lead 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Max 
Joint 
Revenue  
Max 
Cournot-Nash 
 
equal 
n/a 
larger 
n/a 
smaller 
n/a 
larger if 
θ>1/3 
larger 
n/a 
Producers 
Lead 
 equal 
n/a 
smaller 
n/a 
larger if 
θ>1/2 
larger 
n/a 
Importers 
Lead 
  equal 
n/a 
larger if 
rQw2>1 
larger 
n/a 
Tariff Revenue 
Max 
   equal 
n/a 
larger 
n/a 
Joint Revenue 
Max 
    equal 
n/a 
 
 
Comparisons are made by taking the games down the left-hand side and then comparing them to 
the games along the top row. 
• θ is the production share of total consumption that would exist under free trade. 
• r is the absolute value of the ratio of the supply elasticity to the demand elasticity. • Qw is the domestic quantity that would be produced under free trade. 
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Table 3:  Comparison of Consumer Surplus under the Various Trade Games 
 
 
 Production and Import Quota-Setting 
Games 
Tariff-Setting  
Games 
 Cournot 
Nash 
Producers 
Lead 
Importers 
Lead 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Max 
Joint 
Revenue  
Max 
Cournot-Nash 
 
equal 
n/a 
worse 
n/a 
worse 
n/a 
worse 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
Producers 
Lead 
 equal 
n/a 
better if 
θ>1/2 
worse 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
Importers 
Lead 
  equal 
n/a 
better if 
r(1+r)Qw2 < 1 
better 
n/a 
Tariff Revenue 
Max 
   equal 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
Joint Revenue 
Max 
    equal 
n/a 
 
 
Comparisons are made by taking the games down the left-hand side and then comparing them to 
the games along the top row. 
• θ is the production share of total consumption that would exist under free trade. 
• r is the absolute value of the ratio of the supply elasticity to the demand elasticity. • Qw is the domestic quantity that would be produced under free trade. 
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Table 4:  Comparison of Producer Rents under the Various Trade Games 
 
 
 Production and Import Quota-Setting 
Games 
Tariff-Setting  
Games 
 Cournot 
Nash 
Producers 
Lead 
Importers 
Lead 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Max 
Joint 
Revenue  
Max 
Cournot-Nash 
 
equal 
n/a 
worse 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
worse 
n/a 
Producers 
Lead 
 equal 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
worse 
n/a 
Importers 
Lead 
  equal 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
worse 
n/a 
Tariff Revenue 
Max 
   equal 
n/a 
worse 
n/a 
Joint Revenue 
Max 
    equal 
n/a 
 
 
Comparisons are made by taking the games down the left-hand side and then comparing them to 
the games along the top row. 
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Table 5:  Comparison of Import/Tariff Revenue under the Various Trade Games 
 
 
 Production and Import Quota-Setting 
Games 
Tariff-Setting  
Games 
 Cournot 
Nash 
Producers 
Lead 
Importers 
Lead 
Tariff 
Revenue 
Max 
Joint 
Revenue  
Max 
Cournot-Nash 
 
equal 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
worse 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
Producers 
Lead 
 equal 
n/a 
worse 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
Importers 
Lead 
  equal 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
Tariff Revenue 
Max 
   equal 
n/a 
better 
n/a 
Joint Revenue 
Max 
    equal 
n/a 
 
 
Comparisons are made by taking the games down the left-hand side and then comparing them to 
the games along the top row. 
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Figure 1:  Producers and Importers Participate in a 
Production/Import Quota-Setting Game 
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Figure 2:  The Government Replaces Import Quotas with Tariffs   
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